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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2A-3(k) (Supp. 1993). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Was it clearly erroneous for the trial court to 
conclude, based on the evidence presented at trial and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, that Dr. Wilde followed an 
appropriate and acceptable standard of care within the specialty 
of obstetrics during his examination and treatment of 
Mrs. Rivera? 
2. Was it clearly erroneous for the trial court to rely 
upon expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of 
care practiced by competent and qualified obstetricians in this 
and similar communities and to refuse to create a different 
standard as a matter of law? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for the trial courts Findings of 
Fact is: 
This court gives deference to the trial 
court's findings of fact and we will not set 
them aside unless we find them to be clearly 
erroneous. Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). Under 
this standard, we will not disturb factual 
findings unless they are against the clear 
weight of the evidence or we otherwise reach 
a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made (citation omitted). 
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dept. of Transportation, 219 Utah Adv. 
Rpt. 14 (Utah App. 1993). 
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DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
The interpretation of constitutional provisions, statutes, 
ordinances, rules and regulations, with the exception of 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, regarding the standard 
of review, are not thought to be determinative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and 
Disposition in Court Below. 
This is a medical malpractice action concerning the 
obstetrical care the Appellee, Clayton S. Wilde, M.D. 
("Dr. Wilde"), provided to the Appellant, Brenda Rivera 
("Mrs. Rivera"), during her pregnancy in 1989. Mrs. Rivera 
claims that Dr. Wilde negligently failed to diagnose pre-
eclampsia, which is a hypertensive disorder of pregnancy. 
Dr. Wilde maintains that Mrs. Rivera was not pre-eclamptic when 
he last examined her and that his care was entirely appropriate. 
The case proceeded to trial in the Third District Court of 
Salt Lake County before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, without 
a jury. After hearing all of the evidence, Judge Murphy 
concluded that Mrs. Rivera had failed to carry the burden of 
proof to establish a claim for medical malpractice against 
Dr. Wilde, and that the more credible evidence received convinced 
the Court that Dr. Wilde clearly complied with an appropriate and 
acceptable standard of care during his treatment of Mrs. Rivera. 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were entered on June 3, 
1993. 
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B. Statement of Facts. 
Mrs. Rivera's first pre-natal visit with Dr. Wilde was on 
March 1, 1989. During that visit, Dr. Wilde took Mrs. Rivera's 
medical and family history, and he performed a physical 
examination. [Findings of Fact, f 2.] The examination revealed 
that Mrs. Rivera was a healthy 25-year-old woman with below 
average mental ability who was pregnant for the first time. 
Mrs. Rivera weighed 157 pounds and her blood pressure was 98/64. 
[Id.] Based on the information Dr. Wilde collected during this 
visit, he concluded that Mrs. Rivera was a low-risk obstetrical 
patient and estimated that the date of delivery would be 
September 17, 1989. [Id.] Dr. Wilde then told Mrs. Rivera and 
her husband what they could expect during the pregnancy. [Id.] 
At the end of the visit, Dr. Wilde assured the Riveras that they 
could, and should, call him anytime they had any concerns, 
questions or problems. [Id.] Dr. Wilde encourages all his 
patients to call him with their concerns. [Dr. Wilde, R. 1288 -
89.] 
Dr. Wilde saw Mrs. Rivera monthly for routine pre-natal care 
during her pregnancy. [Findings of Fact, f 3.] Beginning early 
in the pregnancy, Mrs. Rivera often complained to Dr. Wilde about 
headaches, which were relieved with Tylenol, and nausea and 
vomiting. [Id.] These symptoms are common during pregnancy and 
Dr. Wilde reassured Mrs. Rivera and her husband that she should 
soon begin to feel better. [Id.] Mrs. Rivera had uneventful and 
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routine pre-natal visits with Dr. Wilde on April 24 and May 22, 
1989. [Id.] 
On June 12, 1989, Mrs. Rivera's husband spoke with 
Dr. Wilde's nurse by telephone. [Id. at J 4.] He reported that 
Mrs. Rivera's feet and legs became swollen after she worked all 
day as a custodian at the University Hospital. [Id.] The nurse 
asked Mr. Rivera whether Mrs. Rivera had any other complaints. 
None were reported. [Id.] The nurse recommended that 
Mrs. Rivera elevate her legs as much as possible and increase her 
water intake. [Id.] The nurse said that Mrs. Rivera should come 
to the office before her next scheduled visit if her condition 
worsened. [Id.] Mrs. Rivera did not return to Dr. Wilde's 
office until her next scheduled visit. [Id. at f 5.] 
Mrs. Rivera's next and final visit took place on June 15, 
1989. [Id.] On that day, she weighed 181 pounds, her fetus was 
26 weeks old, and her blood pressure measured 110/88. [Id. at 
55 2, 5.] Mrs. Rivera repeated her complaints of having 
headaches, which were still relieved with Tylenol, and some 
nausea and vomiting. [Id. at 5 6.] She also complained of some 
fatigue. [Id.] Based on these complaints and her blood 
pressure, Dr. Wilde considered the possibility that Mrs. Rivera 
might have pre-eclampsia, and he began to examine her 
accordingly. [Id. at 55 12, 6.] He checked her blood pressure 
and found it to be 110/84. He checked her urine for the presence 
of protein and found none. [Id. at 5 5.] He then re-checked the 
urine specimen to confirm the absence of protein. [Id.] At the 
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request of Mrs. Rivera's husband, Dr. Wilde carefully looked for 
pathologic edema in Mrs. Rivera's feet, ankles, legs and face, 
and he found none. [Id. at f 6.] The amount of weight gain 
Mrs. Rivera had experienced was not unusual. [Id. at f 12.] Her 
symptoms of headache, nausea and vomiting were not caused by pre-
eclampsia or developing preeclampsia. [Id.] Furthermore, there 
was nothing in Mrs. Rivera's medical or family history, course of 
pregnancy, complaints, or examination and test findings which was 
diagnostic of pre-eclampsia or developing pre-eclampsia. [Id.] 
To the contrary, these symptoms were consistent with a flu-like 
illness that many of Dr. Wilde's patients had recently reported. 
[Jd.] Mrs. Rivera's blood pressure was taken a third time and 
was found to be 110/80. [Jd. at 5 6.] 
At the conclusion of the June 15, 1989 visit, Dr. Wilde 
instructed Mrs. Rivera to take care of herself by taking breaks 
and elevating her feet at work, and by resting and keeping off 
her feet when at home. [Id.] As an additional precaution, 
Dr. Wilde asked Mrs. Rivera to come back for another pre-natal 
visit in two weeks, rather than at the regular interval of one 
month. [Id.] He also told Mrs. Rivera to come in for another 
check up in a few days if she was not feeling better by then. 
[Jd. at 5 6.] Mrs. Rivera did not return to Dr. Wilde's office. 
[Jd. at f 7.] On June 23, 1989, Mrs. Rivera experienced an 
eclamptic seizure. [Jd.] 
The expert testimony and medical literature presented at 
trial established that Dr. Wilde's treatment of Mrs. Rivera 
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complied with an accepted school of thought which is within the 
standard of care. [Id. at 5 9.] Although there is no uniform 
standard of care concerning the criteria for diagnosing 
pre-eclampsia [Id.], it is clearly within an acceptable school of 
thought to define pre-eclampsia as a blood pressure of 140/90 or 
greater in the presence of proteinuria (protein in the urine). 
Swelling or edema, even of the face and hands, and weight gain 
are so common in pregnancy that they are useless for the 
diagnosis of pre-eclampsia. [Id. at f 10.] 
Pre-eclampsia is frequently insidious in its onset and can 
progress to eclampsia very quickly. [Dr. Wilde, R. 1253; 
Dr. Farnsworth, R. 1116; Dr. Wade, R. 862.] In fact, patients 
can develop eclamptic seizures without ever manifesting any signs 
of pre-eclampsia. [Dr. Farnsworth, R. 1116; Dr. Wade, R. 862.] 
Obviously, the fact that Mrs. Rivera suffered an eclamptic 
seizure does not imply that she received substandard care. 
[Dr. Wilde R. 1253; Dr. Farnsworth R. 1116]. 
The school of thought Dr. Wilde followed in evaluating 
Mrs. Rivera for pre-eclampsia is the standard recommended and 
used by the majority of competent and qualified obstetricians and 
is well-supported in the medical literature. [Id. at f 11.] 
Further, the standard of care did not require Dr. Wilde to take 
any additional action or to have Mrs. Rivera return sooner than 
two weeks. [Id. at f 13.] The trial court found that 
Mrs. Rivera failed to demonstrate by a preponderance of the 
evidence with credible expert testimony that the school of 
- 6 -
thought Dr. Wilde followed was insufficient or unsafe. [Id. at 
II 11.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. 
The trial court7s Findings of Fact should be affirmed 
because Mrs. Rivera failed to marshal all of the evidence 
supporting the trial court's Findings and, in any event, the 
evidence clearly supports all of the trial court's Findings. The 
Appellant's argument that the trial court was required to ignore 
a well-established standard of care developed by exhaustive 
medical research and practice is contrary to the established law 
of Utah, and elsewhere, and to sound public and judicial policy. 
Moreover, there is no basis in this record to conclude that the 
standard of care Dr. Wilde followed is unsafe or that some other 
standard is more appropriate. For these reasons, the judgment 
below should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS SHOULD BE UPHELD BECAUSE 
MRS. RIVERA HAS FAILED TO MARSHAL ALL THE EVIDENCE IN 
SUPPORT OF THE FINDINGS AND BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE AMPLY 
SUPPORTS THE COURT'S FINDINGS. 
In attacking the trial court's Findings of Fact, Mrs. Rivera 
bears the burden of first marshaling all of the evidence in 
support of those Findings and then demonstrating that the 
evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is 
insufficient to support the Findings against attack under the 
clearly erroneous standard described in Rule 52(a) of the Utah 
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Rules of Civil Procedure. As this Court explained in Slattery v. 
Covey & Co., Inc.: 
An appellant challenging factual findings 
faces a substantial burden. Trial court's 
findings of fact will be affirmed if they are 
xbased on sufficient evidence, viewing the 
evidence in the light most favorable to the 
trial court's construction.' West Valley 
City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 
1313 (Utah App. 1991). In order to prevail, 
"the challenging party must marshal all 
relevant evidence presented at trial which 
tends to support the findings." Id. That 
party must then show that the same findings 
are "so lacking in support as to be xagainst 
the clear weight of the evidence,' thus 
making them clearly erroneous." Id. at 1315. 
Slattery v. Covey & Co., Inc., 216 Utah Adv. Rpt. 26 (Utah App. 
1993). See also, Reinbold v. Utah, 850 P.2d 487 (Utah App. 
1993); Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899 -
901 (Utah 1989). Under this standard, this Court will "review 
the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's 
findings and affirm if there is a reasonable basis for doing so." 
Reinbold, supra (citing Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 462 
(Utah App. 1987), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988)). 
The marshaling requirement fulfills an important function 
when findings of fact are challenged, as in this case, following 
a lengthy and technically challenging trial. As this Court 
stated in Robb v. Anderton, 225 Utah Adv. Rpt. 22 (Utah App. 
1993) : 
The marshaling requirement provides the 
appellate court the basis from which to 
conduct a meaningful and expedient review of 
facts challenged on appeal. See, Wright v. 
Westside Nursery, 787 P.2d 508, 512 Note 2 
(Utah App. 1990). 
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225 Utah Adv. Rpt. at 25. Thus, in determining whether the 
Appellant has fulfilled the marshaling requirement, the Court 
should determine whether or not it is able to conduct a 
"meaningful and expedient review of the facts" favorable to the 
trial court's finding. When an appellant argues only selected 
evidence favorable to its position without presenting the 
evidence supporting the trial court's finding, this Court will 
affirm the finding. Id. 
This Court, moreover, will not even examine whether a trial 
court's findings are clearly erroneous unless the appellant has 
met the threshold requirement of marshaling all the evidence that 
supports the trial court's findings. As this Court has stated: 
We have shown no reluctance to affirm when 
the appellant fails to adequately marshal the 
evidence. West Valley City, supra (citing 
Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320 (Utah App. 
1990); Turnbaugh v. Anderson, 793 P.2d 939 
(Utah App. 1990) . 
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1313 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
In this case, the Appellant has made no effort to marshal 
the evidence which supports the specific findings she challenges. 
The Appellant claims there is insufficient evidence to support 
the Findings 10, 11, 12 and 14. [Appellant's Brief p. 15]. In 
order to conduct a "meaningful and expedient review of the facts" 
favorable to these findings, this Court needs to have separately 
set forth all of the evidence supporting each specific finding. 
Robb v. Anderton, supra at 25. No effort has been made to do so 
and thus, the Court does not have presented to it the information 
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it needs to facilitate its review. Consequently, the Findings 
should be affirmed. Id. 
Despite this failure to marshal the evidence, if the 
individual Findings under attack are examined in light of the 
evidence at trial, the Court will find abundant support for the 
trial court's conclusions. In Finding No. 10, the Court found: 
Based upon the expert testimony and the 
medical literature presented, the Court finds 
that Defendant's treatment of Plaintiff 
complied with an accepted school of thought 
which is within the standard of care. It was 
appropriate for Defendant to adopt and adhere 
to the school of thought that: (1) defines 
pre-eclampsia as a blood pressure of equal to 
or greater than 140/90 in the presence of 
proteinuria; and (2) considers edema (even of 
the face and hands) and weight gain so common 
in pregnancy that they are useless for the 
diagnosis of pre-eclampsia. 
The standard of care Dr. Wilde followed for diagnosing pre-
eclampsia was clearly established at trial by both expert 
testimony and authoritative medical literature. Dr. Wilde 
testified as an expert witness on his own behalf. He was well-
qualified to do so. He is a board certified obstetrician/ 
gynecologist who was the Chief of the Department of Obstetrics 
and Gynecology at St. Mark's Hospital when he treated 
Mrs. Rivera. [Dr. Wilde R. 1246 - 47.] At that time he 
testified he was President of the Medical Staff at his hospital 
and held a leadership position in the American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists. [Dr. Wilde R. 1247 - 48.] 
Dr. Wilde is also a Clinical Assistant Professor of Obstetrics 
and Gynecology at the University College of Medicine and taught 
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courses on the subject of pre-eclampsia, [Dr. Wilde R. 1248 -
49.] Dr. Wilde testified that the diagnosis of pre-eclampsia is 
dependent on two issues: (1) the patient first must have 
persistent hypertension, defined as a blood pressure of at least 
140/90; and (2) the patient must also have evidence of 
proteinuria. [Dr. Wilde R. 1253 - 54.] Dr. Wilde also 
testified: 
Q. Okay, is your clinical definition of — 
your criteria for diagnosing pre-eclampsia 
recognized by respected and competent 
obstetricians as an appropriate standard in 
this and similar communities? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or 
not it is the majority opinion among 
clinicians in this and other communities? 
A. I would say the vast majority. 
[Dr. Wilde R. 1253 - 54.] 
Dr. Wilde also testified that edema and weight gain are so 
common in pregnancy that they are useless for the diagnosis of 
pre-eclampsia. Edema occurs in 80% of all pregnancies and excess 
weight gain is common in normal pregnancies. [Dr. Wilde R. 
1265.] Edema of the face and hands occurred among 64% of women 
in one study and 3 0% of women studied in the Collaborative 
Perinatal Project involving 39,000 women. [Dr. Wilde R. 1265 -
66. ] 
Dr. Wilde also presented expert testimony from Kent 
Farnsworth, M.D., a board certified obstetrician/gynecologist who 
practices at LDS Hospital, Holy Cross Hospital, University 
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Hospital and Cottonwood Hospital. [Dr. Farnsworth R. 1111 - 12.] 
Dr. Farnsworth is also a Clinical Associate Professor in the 
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the University of Utah 
School of Medicine. On average he delivers 25 babies every 
month. [Dr. Farnsworth R. 1113.] Among the 4,500 patients he 
has delivered, Dr. Farnsworth has diagnosed and treated hundreds 
of patients with pre-eclampsia. [Dr. Farnsworth R. 1113 - 14.] 
The criteria for diagnosing pre-eclampsia in Dr. Farnsworth's 
practice are a blood pressure of at least 140/90 and proteinuria, 
which are also the diagnostic criteria that comprise the accepted 
standard of care for obstetricians in this and similar 
communities. [Dr. Farnsworth R. 1116 - 17.] Dr. Farnsworth also 
agrees that edema and weight gain are so common that they are not 
helpful in diagnosing pre-eclampsia. [Dr. Farnsworth R. 1118 -
19.] 
Although the Appellant neglected to mention it when she 
marshaled the evidence, the testimony of her own expert witness 
supports the trial court's finding. Dr. Maclyn Wade acknowledged 
that Dr. Wilde's definition of hypertension is consistent with an 
accepted school of thought which is within the standard of care. 
[Dr. Wade R. 1034.] Similarly, he agreed that schools of thought 
accepted within the standard of care regard edema, even of the 
hands and face, and weight gain to be insignificant in the 
diagnosis of pre-eclampsia. [Dr. Wade R. 1041, 1044.] 
The Appellant also neglected to cite to this Court the many 
references from authoritative medical literature supporting the 
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standard of care Dr. Wilde followed in this case. We will not 
assume that burden here except to mention two notable 
authorities. Williams Obstetrics, one of the world's most widely 
used and cited medical references in obstetrics, specifically 
recommends the exact diagnostic criteria for pre-eclampsia that 
Dr. Wilde uses. It also specifically rejects the school of 
thought the Appellant urges because those criteria have "little 
clinical value." [Dr. Wilde R. 1256 - 57.] No less an authority 
than the World Health Organization also agrees with this view. 
Following an exhaustive research effort, it defined pre-eclampsia 
for the purposes of diagnosis as prolonged persistent diastolic 
readings of 90 or higher in the presence of proteinuria. In so 
doing, the World Health Organization specifically rejected 
inclusion of edema, weight gain and other factors, including 
incremental blood pressure changes, as a part of that definition. 
[Dr. Wilde R. 1271.] 
The Court's Finding No. 11 was as follows: 
The school of thought Defendant followed in 
his diagnosis and treatment of Plaintiff is 
well supported in the medical literature and 
by competent and qualified experts as an 
approved method of diagnosis and treatment 
recommended and followed by a respectable 
portion of the medical community in the 
specialty of obstetrics and gynecology. The 
Plaintiff has not demonstrated by a 
preponderance of the evidence with credible 
expert testimony that the school of thought 
the Defendant followed is unaccepted, 
insufficient or unsafe. 
Obviously, the evidence introduced at trial which supports 
Finding No. 10 also substantiates Finding No. 11. With respect 
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to what expert testimony at trial was "credible," this Court is 
guided by the principal that "due regard shall be given to the 
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a); Robb v. Anderton, supra at 
25. 
The only expert witness who questioned the school of thought 
the majority of obstetricians throughout the country advocates 
was the Appellant's expert witness, Dr. Maclyn Wade. The trial 
court was rightfully unimpressed with Dr. Wade, finding: 
The Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Maclyn Wade, had 
limited obstetrical experience and his 
testimony was equivocal, unpersuasive and 
lacking in credibility. Dr. Wade gave away 
on cross-examination most of the points he 
made on direct and re-direct examination. 
[Finding No. 8.] The Appellant does not challenge this Finding 
and for good reasons. [Appellant's Brief p. 15.] Dr. Wade had 
limited obstetrical experience throughout his career, delivering 
only one or two babies a month. [Dr. Wade R. 1028.] He 
abandoned obstetrics entirely in 1989. [Dr. Wade R. 1024.] 
While in private practice, his total experience with pre-
eclampsia was limited to a dozen or two patients, all of whom he 
referred to others for treatment. [Dr. Wade R. 1031, 1029.] He 
is, however, well-traveled as an expert witness having testified 
in 60 trials, 1,500 depositions and having made hundreds of 
thousands of dollars as a hired expert. [Dr. Wade R. 1023 - 24.] 
His credibility was further cast in doubt when it was revealed 
that three articles he claimed to have authored and published in 
the medical literature do not exist. [Dr. Wade R. 1013 - 21.] 
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Dr. Farnsworth, who had never previously testified as an 
expert witness and whose clinical obstetrical practice is one of 
Utah/s largest, was far more credible. [Dr. Farnsworth R. Ill, 
1113.] Dr. Farnsworth was specifically asked whether or not the 
diagnostic criteria for pre-eclampsia consisting of hypertension 
of 140/90 in the presence of proteinuria is a "dangerous 
standard" and he responded, "No, I don't think so." 
[Dr. Farnsworth R. 1156.] The fact that a vast majority of 
competent and qualified obstetricians in this and similar 
communities, a large number of obstetrical researchers writing on 
the subject, and the World Health Organization all support and 
use this same standard is compelling evidence supporting the 
trial court's Finding that the standard of care Dr. Wilde 
employed is clearly accepted, sufficient and safe. 
The Court's Finding No. 12 was as follows: 
During Defendant's examination and evaluation 
of Plaintiff on June 15, 1989, the 
possibility of pre-eclampsia was raised, but 
there was nothing in Plaintiff's medical or 
family history, course of pregnancy, 
complaints, or examination and test findings 
which was diagnostic of pre-eclampsia or 
developing pre-eclampsia. To the contrary, 
Plaintiff did not have hypertension or 
proteinuria. Her symptoms of headache, 
nausea and vomiting were not caused by pre-
eclampsia or developing pre-eclampsia. The 
amount of edema and weight gain observed was 
not unusual. Moreover, the risk of pre-
eclampsia and/or eclampsia is extremely low 
in gravid patients at 2 6 weeks gestational 
age. 
Dr. Farnsworth's testimony specifically addresses and supports 
the trial court's Finding. Dr. Farnsworth testified as follows: 
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Q. Her blood pressure when she came in was 
110 over 88? 
A. Yes. 
Q. She had weight gain of — I believe we 
said eight pounds? 
A. Eight pounds, yes. 
Q. And she had edema of her feet? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you recall that complaint? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And no proteinuria? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. Would those features, either 
individually or as a constellation, cause you 
to suspect that she was at risk for 
developing an eclamptic seizure prior to 30 
weeks? 
A. No. 
Q. Would you give us your opinion as to the 
appropriate action within the standard of 
care in addressing that constellation of 
symptoms of Dr. Wilde's [patient]? 
A. Well, as I reviewed the case it appears 
to me that his response was appropriate. 
From reading the record, he examined the 
patient closely, his record indicates that he 
was concerned about the possibility of facial 
edema. He was concerned about the 
possibility of proteinuria. He double-
checked her urine to be sure there was no 
evidence of proteinuria. And probably — 
most probably he checked her blood pressure. 
Yes, on two subsequent occasions. The 
first subsequent the diastolic was 80 and the 
second one was 84. And then they spent some 
time with the patient. His report indicates 
that he told the patient that she should get 
lots of rest, or lots of down time. And he 
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reiterated, as I do in my practice, to the 
patient, if you have any questions or 
concerns or anything that develops that to 
you seems different, I'm here and available. 
You can call me any time, and I would want to 
see you. 
I think for the presentation of symptoms 
at that point, that's within the standard of 
care in this community for surveillance of 
the patient. 
Q. And in similar communities? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Should Dr. Wilde have diagnosed 
Mrs. Rivera as being preeclamptic on the 15th 
of June? 
A. I would not find any criteria for that 
diagnosis. 
[Dr. Farnsworth R. 1125 - 26.] 
Even the Appellant's own expert concurs that Mrs. Rivera's 
symptoms of headache, nausea and vomiting were not caused by pre-
eclampsia or developing pre-eclampsia. [Dr. Wade R. 1047 - 48.] 
Dr. Farnsworth and Dr. Wade also agree that the risk of pre-
eclampsia and/or eclampsia is extremely low at 2 6 weeks of 
pregnancy. [Dr. Wade R. 1032; Dr. Farnsworth R. 1124.] 
The evidence in support of the Court's Finding No. 14 that 
Dr. Wilde clearly complied with an applicable and acceptable 
standard of medical care is extensive, authoritative and 
compelling. Ample citations to the record have already been 
discussed and further elaboration would be redundant. 
Rather than marshalling the evidence as she is required to 
do, the Appellant has simply reasserted the same arguments and 
evidence the trial court found to be unpersuasive and unreliable. 
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It is abundantly clear that each and every Finding of the trial 
court challenged on this appeal is fully supported by competent 
and authoritative evidence. Accordingly, this Court should 
affirm the Findings of the Court below and its Judgment in favor 
of Dr. Wilde. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RELIED UPON EXPERT TESTIMONY 
TO ESTABLISH THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF CARE AND 
PROPERLY REFUSED TO CREATE A DIFFERENT STANDARD AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
The trial court applied the following legal standard to the 
evidence presented: 
In order to recover upon a claim of medical 
malpractice, Plaintiff has the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence 
that Defendant deviated from the standard of 
care applicable to physicians specializing in 
obstetrics and gynecology practicing in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, or similar communities, in 
1989, and that said deviation from the 
standard of care was a proximate cause of the 
injuries and damages claimed by Plaintiff. 
[Conclusions of Law, f 1.] This standard comports with firmly 
established Utah law. See, King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, 832 
P.2d 858, 862-63 (Utah 1992); Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 
102 (Utah 1992); Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Ctr., 791 
P.2d 193, 195-96 (Utah 1990); Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348, 
351-52 (Utah 1980); Kim v. Anderson, 610 P.2d 1270, 1271 (Utah 
1980); Marsh v. PemJberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108, 1100-11 
(1959), overruled on other grounds, Swan v. Lamb, 584 P.2d 814 
(Utah 1978); Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 238, 310 P.2d 523, 
525-26 (Utah 1957). State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204, 1207 (Utah 
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App. 1989); Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817, 821-22 (Utah App. 
1988); Hoopiiaiana v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 
270, 271 (Utah App. 1987); Martin v. Mott, 744 P.2d 337, 338 
(Utah App. 1987); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 
740 P.2d 262, 264 (Utah App. 1987); Virginia S. v. Salt Lake Care 
Ctr., 741 P.2d 969, 970 (Utah App. 1987). 
It is equally well-established in the State of Utah that, 
with few exceptions, expert testimony is required to establish 
the standard of care by which a physician's conduct is to be 
measured. Arnold v. Curtis, 846 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1992); King v. 
Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858 (Utah 1992); 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992); Jennings v. 
Stoker, 652 P.2d 912 (Utah 1982); Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 
(Utah 1980); Marsh v. Pemberton, 347 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1959); 
Huggins v. Hicken, 310 P.2d 523 (Utah 1957); Robb v. Anderton, 
225 Utah Adv. Rpt. 222 (Utah App. 1993); Anton v. Thomas, 806 
P.2d 744 (Utah App. 1991); George v. LDS Hospital, 797 P.2d 1117 
(Utah App. 1990); Butterfield v. Okubo, 790 P.2d 94 (Utah App. 
1990), rev'd on other grounds, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992); Newsom v. 
Gold Cross Service, Inc., 779 P.2d 692 (Utah App. 1989); .Reeves 
v. Geigy Pharmaceutical Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah App. 1988); 
Chadwick v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817 (Utah App. 1988); Virginia S. 
v. Salt Lake Care Center, 741 P.2d 969 (Utah App. 1987); 
Hoopiiaiana v. Intermountain Health Care, 740 P.2d 240 (Utah App. 
1987); Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care Inc., 740 P.2d 262 
(Utah App. 1987). 
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The issues presented by medical malpractice cases generally 
involve medical questions and medica udgments beyond the 
1 
Searle Pharmaceuticals lac, s'upra. -^ stated \r Marsh v. 
Pemberton, supra: 
It is seldom that a doctor's standard of 
care, because it is so specialized, is known 
or is within the knowledge of a layman. We 
believe this case to be the type that 
required expert testimony as to a standard of 
care and that the fa I lure of the plaintiff to 
call an expert medical witness and establish 
such a standard was fatal to his recovery. 
3 :i I I • 2: ::i a t: III II II 1 . \:..>.. ^ assistance expert medical 
testimony, \*x finder * 'a-* whether ; ?*-- oi vary, is 
impermissil: 
conjecture ^ . ...v standard — * as required »f the 
Defendant and whether :ii Ill:: \ /as met. Marsh • Emberton, Id. ; 
Anderson l i i: • • I :• I I J I ., .1 I 2 1 2 62 1 3 s > 2 :: (111 S 13) ; 
Hoopiiaiana \ Intermountain Health Care 1 i ic,, supra. 
In the present case, the trial coin: t correct] y relied upon 
the testi irit ::H i;; ::  -f exper t ; :i t:i lesses t :: • I =t = r mi i I = \ /I: l a t: 
of car e was by which Di , Wilde's conduct would be measured. Aii 
of the expert witnesses, including the Plaintiff -vn agreed 
that
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accepted by competent and q
 :^iified obstetricians tnis and 
similar communities throughoi 1 • country I »-v,.e extent that 
t e standard . r^re, the Cour t 
found i:- v.est J m^n1. • : equivocal, unpersuasive and lacking i 11 
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credibility." [Finding No. 8.] The trial court also 
specifically concluded that the Appellant's arguments and 
proffered evidence that the school of thought Dr. Wilde followed 
was unaccepted, insufficient or unsafe were unpersuasive. 
[Finding No. 11.] As discussed elsewhere in this brief, those 
Findings are fully supported by the evidence. 
The Appellant now urges this Court to judicially create its 
own standard of care for physicians that is different from the 
one the trial court found to be an appropriate and safe standard 
practiced by the majority of competent, careful and knowledgeable 
obstetricians in this community and around the country. In 
short, Appellant asks this Court to overturn decades of well-
established case law and to substitute its Judgment for that of 
the medical community in determining how to appropriately 
diagnose and treat a medical complication of pregnancy. The 
Court should decline the invitation. 
The issue in this case is not, as the Appellant contends, 
whether or not the finder of fact is required to accept as the 
standard of care, a parochial or antiquated practice simply 
because it is followed by some practitioners. Unlike Swan v. 
Lamb, 584 P.2d 814 (Utah 1978), Vassos v. Roussalis, 625 P.2d 
768 (Wyo. 1981), United Blood Services v. Quintana, 827 P.2d 509 
(Colo. 1992), and other cases cited in the Appellant's brief, the 
trial court admitted into evidence all of the experts' opinions 
on what constituted the appropriate standard of care. On the 
basis of the expert testimony and authoritative literature he 
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found * ! . i 
conformed Lw ,. . accepted, safe and appropriate standard ^ 
What the Appellant really advocates is a form of strict 
:: 
basis The Appellant
 r,, . i^u rfould permit judges and juries 
:reate standards of t:<\i- tron the:* ">w xpectations 
: • 1 
experts. Ir i support of thi s proposition, the Appellant relies 
upon an obscure and discredited decision, Helling v Carey, 519 
I .2- i 983 ( If I 1 .Ill S ; I) . 
In Helling the Washington Court reached the remarkable 
conclusion that :i t was appropriate for the Court to 
expectations of medicine regardless : i t.h< onsensus of medical 
opini on to the contrary J ustice utter xn a concurring opinion 
observ ed: 
It seem [sic] to me we are i n reality , 
imposing liability, because, in choosing 
between an innocent plaintiff and a doctor, 
who acted reasonably according to his 
specialty but could have prevented the full 
effects of this disease by administering a 
simple, harmless test and treatment, the 
plaintiff should not have to bear the risk of 
loss. As such, imposition of liability 
approaches that of strict liabili ty 
The concept of 1 io] ci i i lg a physic I ai I who acted reasonably 
according * specialty strictly liable liat le without 
court -u^t , • . *.. J, ,K i , . « jeuLbiui; Wds released, the 
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Utah Supreme Court and this Court have had no fewer than 21 
opportunities to review the long-standing tradition that 
physicians in this state are liable only for injuries proximately 
caused by a departure from the accepted standard of care of the 
profession in this and similar communities. [Appellee's Brief 
pp. 18 - 20.] In every instance, the courts have reaffirmed the 
legal standard the trial court used in this case. The Helling 
decision has never been cited in any Utah decision and it has 
remained in its appropriate place of obscurity in American 
jurisprudence. Properly so. As the court observed in Osborn v. 
Irvin Memorial Blood Bank, 5 Cal. App. 4th 234, 7 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
101 (Ct. App. 1992) about the Helling decision, which it refused 
to follow: 
Most of the commentary on this case has been 
unfavorable. A contemporary observer wrote 
that the Helling court had "unwisely . . . 
arrogated to itself medical decisions, 
superimposing its medical judgment upon the 
collective experience of the medical 
profession. Can it really be said that the 
medical judgments of the courts will be 
'right' more often than those guided by 
proved medical practices?" (Citing King, In 
Search of a Standard of Care for the Medical 
Profession: The "Accepted Practice" Formula 
(1975) 28 Vand. L. Rev. 1213, 1250; and 
Keeton, Medical Negligence — the Standard of 
Care (1979) 10 Texas Tech L. Rev. 351, 367 -
8). 
5 Cal. App. 4th at 279. The court also noted that Helling is at 
odds with the underlying judicial philosophy, which the Utah 
courts certainly share, of deference to another learned 
profession: 
- 23 -
The basic reason why professionals are 
usually held only to a standard of custom and 
practice is that their informed approach to 
matters outside common knowledge should not 
be "evaluated by the ad hoc judgments of a 
lay judge or lay jurors aided by hindsight" 
(citation omitted). In the words of a 
leading authority, "When it can be said that 
the collective wisdom of the profession is 
that a particular course of action is the 
desirable course, then it would seem that the 
collective wisdom should be followed by the 
courts." (Citing Keeton, supra, 10 Texas 
Tech L. Rev. at pp. 3 64 - 3 65.) 
Although Helling in an emaciated form continues J haunt the 
State Washingtc -•-*.-. fr H~H » . ** ;>^r^:^tion where a 
-.; _ unnn a 
physician whose diagnosis and treatment were consistent with the 
standard of c a m practiced both locally and nati onally. 
Even ashington, the courts have retreated from H elli ng 
and, as ^ . .-.; :v. / interpreted, :i t would have no application to 
the fact- • ' ins
 c a s e in a ny e^ rent. li: i !" I = • = • I :s i 1 1 a r .: : 55 0 I 2 1 
.LIlj"li( l. ^..^h App. 1 976), the court concluded that the Helling 
holding "was intended to be r estricted solely to i ts owi I #i mi que ' 
facts, ! If £ = • f a :i 1 \ lr e t :: • test for ! jl a/i ::ic: :: m c Ii :i I I :f :: ha r d s t 
Overlake Hospital Medical Center, ; 96 P. 2d 3 3 7 (Wash. App. 1990) 
the cour- . . .-.':-., n Dtwithstanding, expert testimony 
i s !, I in I  
"reasonably pruden u u n nei.,. 
The standard of care against whicl i a health 
care provider is judged is generally 
established by expert testimony. This 
requirement has evolved to a standard of 
reasonably prudent medical care, Reasonably 
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prudent medical care is not within the 
knowledge of lay persons. Thus, although the 
standard of care is not restricted to what is 
actually practiced, it must be determined by 
reference to expert testimony as to what is 
reasonably prudent. Contrary to the 
[plaintiff's] argument, the law does not 
permit a jury to base a standard of care on 
what it believes to be a prudent expectation 
of society or patients. 
Richards v. Overlake Hospital Medical Center, Id. at 744 - 745 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added). In addition, in Keogan v. 
Holy Family Hospital, 622 P.2d 1246, 1259 (Wash. 1980) the 
Washington Supreme Court emphasized that: 
This court has never adopted a standard of 
care that would always require a physician to 
always rule out potentially fatal causes of 
symptoms before proceeding with treatment, 
regardless of the standard of care in the 
medical community; the evidence in this case 
does not support such a holding as a matter 
of law. A wrong diagnosis is not in itself 
negligence. 
In this case, the expert testimony the trial court found to 
be credible established that the standard of care Dr. Wilde 
followed was well-supported in the medical literature and by 
competent and qualified experts as an approved method of 
diagnosis and treatment recommended and followed by specialists 
in obstetrics. [Finding No. 11.] The court also specifically 
found that there was no reason to believe that the standard of 
care Dr. Wilde followed was in any way unaccepted, insufficient 
or unsafe. [Id.] The trial court appropriately relied on expert 
testimony. Neither it nor a jury should be permitted to "base a 
standard of care on what it believes to be a prudent expectation 
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Finally, :r. closing, ill is also worth considering the 
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Appellant's expectation ui physicians a-^ che standard of care, 
The Appellant argues that Wilde and, * course, all other 
11 i 1 if 
tht blood pressure .. every pregnant patien ever* , hours If a 
rise In hln^-i pressure - diastolic -»>• -•'• n— cyc,rp) j c j s 
obser < 'r<= .• I ! ] II 11 i II 
suggests that such a practice ot repeating blood pressure 
measurements would be "simple, »a?" harmless, inexpensive and 
According • * -a . terature, 73% of a]1 women during 
perfect] *--* pregnancies • ' demonstrate a i::li se i n blood 
j* •- ol ic. 
I i-de H * ; Wilde's experience, 75% of hi s 
>.«,+^
 r-+-,-. demonstrate a i±t>t; xn J^ JL^ U^  pressure oi LI -•* degree 
• ' veer.,- f pregnancy. Mrs, R:i ver a 1 lad no proteinuria, her 
headaches, nausea and vomiting, even in her own expert's opinion, 
wore :rr<">lated Lu " rr-eclampsia and bhe had some swe] I i in | nl IHM 
. . h oncur.q . ; pregnancies, aiiu I' MM ' -
48; Dr. Wilde : 12(>1^ . ••;.>. •> words, Mrs. Rivera was 
indistinguishab * e 
standarc ^ui *. required roonitui jii^  Mia. r i vera every six hours 
for the last _A months _i __„i pregnancy, u^_ other physicians 
would be obliged to do so as well for 75% of their patients who 
would fall in this category. According to the Appellant's 
statistics, if there are approximately 36,000 live births in Utah 
each year [Appellant's Brief p. 22.], 27,000 of them would 
require the intensive monitoring the Appellant insists should be 
the standard of care as a matter of law. The burden of doing so 
would be staggering. Meanwhile, it is undisputed that the risk 
of an eclamptic seizure, such as Mrs. Rivera experienced, before 
the 28th week of pregnancy is extremely remote -— between 1 in 
30,000 and 1 in 100,000. [Dr. Wilde R. 1290.] In other words, 
an eclamptic seizure like Mrs. Rivera's occurs once every one to 
three years in Utah. These statistics, combined with the fact 
that eclampsia cannot always be detected, treated or prevented 
regardless of the intensity of surveillance, demonstrate that any 
alleged benefit of the Appellant's standard is overwhelmed by the 
burden it would impose on Utah's obstetricians and obstetrical 
patients. 
Mrs. Rivera's definition of pre-eclampsia and argument for 
following Helling v. Carey reflect her attempt to persuade this 
Court to adopt strict liability in medical malpractice cases. 
Indeed, Mrs. Rivera attempts to define negligence by the fact of 
her disease, arguing that her "eclamptic seizures and stroke-like 
condition are proof positive of an unsafe standard." 
[Appellant's Brief p. 32.] Mrs. Rivera's position, however, is 
at odds with well-established Utah law. "The law is clear that 
an undesired complication or result from medical treatment does 
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CONCLUSION 
/ 
considered evidence tm* parties offered
 :n support :t 
their respect : " f r-^jti''- 4^ - evaluating the credibility ui 
tl IJIIE ¥ :ii tnesses \ : i on \jpnn ^ nH 
additional study of the materials before / Juciq- Murphy 
adopted Findings based upon thr evidence e lounu i 
ai id persuasive. The Appellant has failed to demonstrate any 
valid reason \*- t.his Court should conclude that the trial 
court 
Rather than marshaling the evidence as she is required to 
do, the Appellant merely recites ad nauseam the same arguments 
should reject them cis ' n it i >s LI- \ ^\ judge's role, ~*" 
this Court's, to weigh the evidence which, _:: this case, amply 
s I • • 9 . 
Having no factual basis iu reverse the lower court, the 
Appellant argues that this Court
 :,houl.i jettison decades of 
er- I J Il , .1 
physicians, :•• lega* precedent icr such a proposition is as 
discredited and misguided as the premise upon whicn n is based. 
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As much as the Appellant would like to ignore expert medical 
opinion and retrospectively create her own personalized standard 
of care to impose upon the medical community, the courts of this 
State have wisely chosen to avoid such hubris. The trial court 
appropriately relied upon competent expert testimony to ascertain 
the prevailing and appropriate standard of care by which to 
measure Dr. Wilde's conduct. It was clearly not error to do so. 
We respectfully ask the Court to affirm the Judgment of the 
court below. 
ir*4 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this \H day of February, 1994. 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
By: <fa 
ELLIOTT J. WILLIAMS 
BRUckJil- JENSEN 
Attorneys for 
Defendant/Appellee 
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ADDENDUM 
i . i 
2. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
Tab l 
] UTAH RU LES OF CI V IL PROCEDURE 496 
the jurors that they are the exclusive judges of all 
questions of fact. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Rule 52. F ind ings by the cour t . 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts with-
out a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall 
find the facts specially and state separately its con-
clusions of law thereon, and judgment shall be en-
tered pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which 
constitute the grounds of its action. Requests for find-
ings are not necessary for purposes of review. Find-
ings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary 
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly errone-
ous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity 
of the trial court to judge the credibility of the wit-
nesses. The findings of a master, to the extent that 
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the find-
ings of the court. It will be sufficient if the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and re-
corded in open court following the close of the evi-
dence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of de-
cision filed by the court. The trial court need not en-
ter findings of fact and conclusions of law in rulings 
on motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). The 
court shall, however, issue a brief written statement 
of the ground for its decision on all motions granted 
under Rules 12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground. 
(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made not 
later than 10 days after entry of judgment the court 
may amend its findings or make additional findings 
and may amend the judgment accordingly. The mo-
tion may be made with a motion for a new trial pur-
suant to Rule 59. When findings of fact are made in 
actions tried by the court without a jury, the question 
of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the find-
ings may thereafter be raised whether or not the 
party raising the question has made in the district 
court an objection to such findings or has made either 
a motion to amend them, a motion for judgment, or a 
motion for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. Except in actions for divorce, findings of fact 
and conclusions of law may be waived by the parties 
to an issue of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear at the 
trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, entered in 
the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan . 1, 1987.) 
Rule 53. Mas te r s . 
(a) Appointment a n d compensa t ion . Any or all 
of the issues in an action may be referred by the court 
to a master upon the written consent of the parties, or 
the court may appoint a master in an action, in accor-
dance with the provisions of Subdivision (b) of this 
rule. As used in these rules the word "master" in-
cludes a referee, an auditor, and an examiner. The 
compensation to be allowed to a master shall be fixed 
by the court, and shall be charged upon such of the 
parties or paid out of any fund or subject matter of the 
action, which is in the custody and control of the 
court as the court may direct. The master shall not 
retain his report as security for his compensation; but 
when the party ordered to pay the compensation al-
lowed by the court does not pay it after notice and 
within the time prescribed by the court, the master is 
entitled to a writ of execution against the delinquent 
party. 
(b) Reference. A reference to a master shall be the 
exception and not the rule. In actions to be tried by a 
jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues 
are complicated; in actions to be tried without a jury, 
save in matters of account, a reference shall, in the 
absence of the written consent of the parties, be made 
only upon a showing that some exceptional condition 
requires it. 
(c) Powers. The order of reference to the master 
may specify or limit his powers and may direct him to 
report only upon particular issues or to do or perform 
particular acts or to receive and report evidence only 
and may fix the time and place for beginning and 
closing the hearings and for the filing of the master's 
report. Subject to the specifications and limitations 
stated in the order, the master has and shall exercise 
the power to regulate all proceedings in every hear-
ing before him and to do all acts and take all mea-
sures necessary or proper for the efficient perfor-
mance of his duties under the order. He may require 
the production before him of evidence upon all mat-
ters embraced in the reference, including the produc-
tion of all books, papers, vouchers, documents, and 
writings applicable thereto. He may rule upon the 
admissibility of evidence unless otherwise directed by 
the order of reference and has the authority to put 
witnesses on oath and may himself examine them 
and may call the parties to the action and examine 
them upon oath. When a party so requests, the mas-
ter shall make a record of the evidence offered and 
excluded in the same manner and subject to the same 
limitations as provided in the Utah Rules of Evidence 
for a court sitting without a jury. 
(d) Proceedings. 
(1) Meetings. When a reference is made, the 
clerk shall forthwith furnish the master with a 
copy of the order of reference. Upon receipt 
thereof unless the order of reference otherwise 
provides, the master shall forthwith set a time 
and place for the first meeting of the parties or 
their attorneys to be held within 20 days after 
the date of the order of reference and shall notify 
the parties or their attorneys. It is the duty of the 
master to proceed with all reasonable diligence. 
Either party, on notice to the parties and master, 
may apply to the court for an order requiring the 
master to speed the proceedings and to make his 
report. If a party fails to appear at the time and 
place appointed, the master may proceed ex parte 
or, in his discretion, adjourn the proceedings to a 
future day, giving notice to the absent party of 
the adjournment. 
(2) Witnesses. The parties may procure the 
attendance of witnesses before the master by the 
issuance and service of subpoenas as provided in 
Rule 45. If without adequate excuse a witness 
fails to appear or give evidence, he may be pun-
ished as for a contempt and be subjected to the 
consequences, penalties, and remedies provided 
in Rules 37 and 45. 
(3) Statement of accounts. When matters of 
accounting are in issue before the master, he 
may prescribe the form in~ which the accounts 
shall be submitted and in any proper case may 
require or receive in evidence a statement by a 
certified public accountant who is called as a wit-
ness. Upon objection of a party to any of the 
items thus submitted or upon a showing that the 
form of statement is insufficient, the master may 
require a different form of statement to be fur-
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The above-entitled matter 
the Honorable Michael Murphy, one of tl, judges ~he above-
entitled court -he 22nd day * Septembei 199. Plaintiff 
Brenda 
her attorneys of record, .Robert B. Sykes, James D y" :ii los and 
Tamara J. Hauge of and for Sykes & Vilos, Defendant having been 
present in person and represented by his attorneys of record, 
Elliott J. Williams and Bruce H. Jensen of and for Williams & 
Hunt, the Court having received the Stipulation of the parties 
that the claims of Plaintiff Antonio R. Rivera shall be decided, 
as to a finding of liability, upon the evidence presented and the 
judgment of the Court as to the claims of Plaintiff Brenda 
Rivera, having heard the testimony of the witnesses, having 
reviewed the exhibits entered into evidence, having heard the 
arguments of counsel, having considered proposed findings and 
conclusions submitted by the parties and the memoranda of counsel 
submitted therewith, and with good cause appearing therefore, 
does now enter its: 
FINDINGS OP PACT 
1. In early February 1989, Plaintiff Brenda Rivera sought 
the services of Defendant, a specialist in obstetrics and 
gynecology, to care for her in conjunction with her first 
pregnancy. At the time, Plaintiff was 25 years old. 
2. At the time of Plaintiff's first pre-natal visit to 
Defendant on March 1, 1989, Defendant determined on the basis of 
Plaintiff's medical and family history and physical examination 
that she was a low risk obstetrical patient, that the estimated 
gestational age of the fetus was 11 % weeks, and that the 
estimated date of confinement (for delivery) was September 17, 
1989. Defendant provided information to Plaintiff and her 
husband about what they could expect during the pregnancy and 
assured them that they could, and should, call him anytime they 
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had any concerns or problems. During her pregnancy, Plaintiff 
had the following blood pressure and weights at the times 
indicated 
Date Weeks Weight B.P. (Systolic/ 
Diastolic) 
3/1/89 11% 157 98/64 
4/24/89 19 170 110/72 
5/22/89 24-5 173 120/68 
ML10/88 
6/15/89 26 181 110/84 
LllO/80 
3. Plaintiff was seen monthly by Defendant for routine pre-
natal care. During these visits she complained to Defendant about 
persistent headaches, which were relieved with Tylenol, and 
nausea and vomiting. These symptoms are common during pregnancy 
and Defendant reassured Plaintiff and her husband that she should 
soon begin to feel better. 
4. On June 12, 1989, Plaintiff's husband spoke with 
Defendant's nurse by telephone and reported that Plaintiff was 
experiencing some swelling in her feet and legs after being on 
them all day. After questioning him about other complaints and 
learning of none, the nurse recommended that Plaintiff elevate 
her legs as much as possible and increase her water intake. If 
her condition worsened she was to come in before her next 
scheduled visit. 
5. When Plaintiff visited Defendant on her next scheduled 
visit on June 15, 1989, the estimated gestational age of the 
fetus was 26 weeks. Plaintiff's blood pressure was measured as 
110/88 and a urine test revealed no protein in her urine. 
- 3 -
Defendant repeated the blood pressure measurement, which was 
found to be 110/84, and rechecked the urine specimen to confirm 
the absence of proteinuria. 
6. During that visit, Plaintiff repeated her complaints of 
having headaches, which were still relieved with Tylenol, and 
some nausea and vomiting. She also complained of some fatigue. 
The symptoms of which Plaintiff complained were consistent with a 
flu-like illness that many of Defendant's patients had recently 
reported. At the request of the Plaintiff's husband, Defendant 
also carefully examined Plaintiff's feet, ankles, legs and face 
and found no pathologic edema. Defendant instructed Plaintiff to 
take breaks at work so that she could have her legs elevated, to 
rest and keep off her feet when at home and to take care of 
herself. Defendant told Plaintiff that she should start feeling 
better in a few days, but, if she did not or got worse, she 
should come in to be checked. Defendant asked Plaintiff to come 
back for another pre-natal visit in two weeks, rather than at the 
regular interval of one month. Plaintiff's blood pressure was 
taken a third time and was measured at 110/80. During this 
office visit the Defendant considered the possibility of pre-
eclampsia and upon examination and evaluation ruled out the 
diagnosis of pre-eclampsia in accordance with the accepted school 
of thought to which he adhered. 
7. Plaintiff experienced an eclamptic seizure on June 23, 
1989. She had no contact with Defendant between the time of the 
last office visit on June 15, 1989, and the eclamptic seizure. 
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8. Plaintiff and Defendant called expert witnesses to 
provide testimony in support of their respective positions. The 
Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Maclyn Wade, had limited obstetrical 
experience and his testimony was equivocal, unpersuasive and 
lacking in credibility. Dr. Wade gave away on cross-examination 
most of the points he made on direct and redirect examination. 
9. The expert testimony adduced during trial and the 
medical literature to which reference was made by the witnesses 
clearly established that there is no uniform standard of care 
followed by all competent practitioners, but rather a cacophony 
of opinion, on the subject of the criteria for diagnosing pre-
eclampsia. 
10. Based upon the expert testimony and medical literature 
presented, the Court finds that Defendant's treatment of 
Plaintiff complied with an acceptable school of thought which is 
within the standard of care. It was appropriate for Defendant to 
adopt and adhere to the school of thought that: (1) defines pre-
eclampsia as a blood pressure of equal to or greater than 140/90 
in the presence of proteinuria; and (2) considers edema (even of 
the face and hands) and weight gain as so common in pregnancy 
that they are useless for the diagnosis of pre-eclampsia. 
11. The school of thought Defendant followed in his 
diagnosis and treatment of Plaintiff is well-supported in the 
medical literature and by competent and qualified experts as an 
approved method of diagnosis and treatment recommended and 
followed by a respectable portion of the medical community in the 
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specialty of obstetrics and gynecology. The Plaintiff has not 
demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence with credible 
expert testimony that the school of thought Defendant followed is 
unaccepted, insufficient or unsafe. 
12. During Defendant's examination and evaluation of 
Plaintiff on June 15, 1989, the possibility of pre-eclampsia was 
raised, but there was nothing in Plaintiff's medical or family 
history, course of pregnancy, complaints, or examination and test 
findings which was diagnostic of pre-eclampsia or developing pre-
eclampsia. To the contrary, Plaintiff did not have hypertension 
or proteinuria. Her symptoms of headache, nausea, and vomiting 
were not caused by pre-eclampsia or developing pre-eclampsia. 
The amount of edema and weight gain observed was not unusual. 
Moreover, the risk of pre-eclampsia and/or eclampsia is extremely 
low in gravid patients at 26 weeks gestational age. 
13. Defendant acted appropriately on June 15, 1989, in 
changing his usual procedure and instructing Plaintiff to return 
in two weeks rather than the usual four week interval. The 
standard of care did not require Defendant to take any further 
action or to have the patient return sooner than two weeks. 
14. Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proof to 
establish a claim for medical malpractice or negligence against 
Defendant and the more credible evidence received convinces the 
Court that Defendant clearly complied with an applicable and 
acceptable standard of medical care in his treatment and care of 
Plaintiff during her pregnancy. 
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15. Plaintiff suffered eclamptic seizures on June 23, 1989. 
The eclampsia caused Plaintiff physical and mental injuries. The 
Court makes no findings on the categories or items of damage. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. In order to recover upon a claim for medical 
malpractice, Plaintiff has the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Defendant deviated from the 
standard of care applicable to physicians specializing in 
obstetrics and gynecology practicing in Salt Lake City, Utah, or 
similar communities, in 1989, and that said deviation from the 
standard of care was a proximate cause of the injuries and 
damages claimed by Plaintiff. 
2. Plaintiff Brenda Rivera has failed to meet her burden of 
proof on the elements of her medical malpractice claim against 
Defendant and Defendant is therefore entitled to a judgment in 
his favor of no cause of action upon the claims of Plaintiff 
Brenda Rivera and, based upon the Stipulation of the parties 
herein, and with good cause appearing, is further entitled to a 
judgment in his favor of no cause of action upon the claims of 
Plaintiff Antonio R. Rivera. 
5. Defendant is entitled to be awarded his Court costs 
incurred herein. 
DATED this day of U^~*- , 1993. 
' BY THE COURT: 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BRENDA RIVERA, : 
: AMENDED JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, : 
v. : 
: Civil No. 900902630 
CLAYTON S. WILDE, M.D., : 
: Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Defendant. : 
ANTONIO R. RIVERA, by and : 
through his Guardian Ad Litem : 
TONY RIVERA, also known as : 
Antonio R. Rivera, : 
Plaintiff, : Civil No. 910907496 
v. : 
CLAYTON S. WILDE, M.D., : 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled matter having come on for trial before 
the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, one of the judges of the above-
entitled Court, on the 22nd day of September, 1992, Plaintiff 
having been present in person and represented by her attorneys of 
record, Robert B. Sykes, James D. Vilos and Tamara J. Hauge of 
and for Sykes & Vilos, and Defendant having been present in 
person and represented by his attorneys, Elliott J. Williams and 
Bruce H. Jensen of and for Williams & Hunt, the Court having 
received the stipulations of the parties, having heard the 
testimony of the witnesses, having reviewed the exhibits entered 
into evidence, having heard the arguments of counsel, and now 
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
with good cause appearing therefore, 
JUDGMENT IS HEREBY ENTERED in favor of Defendant and against 
Plaintiffs Brenda Rivera and Antonio R. Rivera, no cause of 
action, with costs awarded to Defendant in the amount of $3,284. 
DATED this day of Us-*-*— , 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RO 
T. 
Attorneys 
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